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ARTICLES
Is International Environmental Law Really
"Law"?: An Analysis of Application in
Domestic Courts
CARL BRUCH*
Is international environmental law really "law"?' There is no
standing legislative body that elaborates international environ-
mental norms, standards, or procedures. International law often
consists of general proscriptions or obligations that states are
charged with implementing and enforcing. The bodies tasked
with administering international environmental agreements
(namely the secretariats, functioning on behalf of the respective
conferences of the parties known as COPs) have a limited man-
date to take measures to compel compliance: They possess limited
investigative powers and no authority to arrest offenders. These
bodies often rely on the voluntary cooperation of the member
states, and their effective function is to serve the member states.
There are relatively few enforcement mechanisms to punish viola-
tions of the agreements, and these often have a combination of
facilitative and punitive roles and are only beginning to function
in practice. 2
* Carl Bruch is a Senior Attorney and Co-Director of International Programs at
the Environmental Law Institute (ELI). The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not represent the views of ELI. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges research assistance from Sarah King, Roman Czebiniak, and James Shepherd,
as well as the editorial assistance of the editors and staff of the Pace Environmental
Law Review. Support for the research came from the Environmental Law Institute,
World Resources Institute, and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
1. Cf. Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. L. REV.
1293 (1985). For the purposes of this article, "international environmental law" in-
cludes international environmental agreements (including multilateral and bilateral
treaties, conventions, protocols, and other similar instruments); customary interna-
tional law (which, with multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), constitutes
the body of "hard" law); and declarations and other "soft" law.
2. International environmental agreements that have established compliance
mechanisms include, inter alia, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
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Because international environmental law is the result of in-
ternational negotiations among states and ultimately a compro-
mise among competing interests, it is often general and flexible.
It typically entails general provisions that envision domestic im-
plementing legislation to provide the specific details, standards,
and procedures to make international environmental law opera-
tional. Depending on the terms of a specific international agree-
ment, countries may have flexibility when adopting implementing
legislation so long as the legislation gives force to the operational
provisions of the agreement. Unless specifically prohibited or pre-
empted by the agreement, countries may also adopt more protec-
tive measures.
Without conventional legislative, executive, or judicial bodies
and in light of the generality of many provisions, international en-
vironmental law lacks many of the traditional indicia of law. It
can look more like international policy, in which states pledge to
undertake certain measures. To the extent that international en-
vironmental law is binding, it is binding at the international level
between states.
So why is there any debate regarding the legal status of inter-
national environmental law in domestic fora?
National constitutions often reference international law as a
legitimate source of domestic law, 3 along with the constitution,
statutes, regulations, and (where applicable) common law juris-
prudence. Moreover, as this article explores, an increasing num-
ber of litigants and courts in a growing number of countries have
Ozone Layer; the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Deci-
sion-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Conven-
tion); the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES); the Kyoto Protocol; the Basel Convention; and the Cartagena Pro-
tocol on Biosafety. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAw 171-228 (2nd ed. 2003) (including discussions of compliance mechanisms
for the Montreal Protocol, the Aarhus Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Basel
Convention); Veit Koester, Review of Compliance Under the Aarhus Convention: A
Rather Unique Compliance Mechanism, J. EuR. ENVTL. & PLAN. L., Jan. 2005, at 31;
ROSALIND REEVE, POLICING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: THE
CITES TREATY AND COMPLIANCE (2002) (tracing the evolution of the CITES compli-
ance system and providing detailed case studies of countries subject to trade sanc-
tions for failing to comply with the treaty).
3. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. pt. IV, sec. 51(c) (providing that "The State shall en-
deavor to... foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings
of organised people with one another"); PAPuA-N.G. CONST. pt. III, div. 3, sub. C(39)(3)
(stating a court may have regard to, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, sec. 39(1)(b) (re-
quiring courts, in interpreting the Bill of Rights, to consider international law).
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sought recourse to international law, including international envi-
ronmental law, in deciding cases. The breadth and extent of these
decisions indicates that they cannot be dismissed as outcome-ori-
ented aberrations. Thus, the practical application of international
environmental law in specific, concrete cases provides a challenge
to established dogma regarding the role of international environ-
mental law.
Much has been written about the role that international envi-
ronmental law should play in domestic environmental law, policy,
and management: in shaping domestic legislation and regula-
tions, in promoting particular governmental non-regulatory ac-
tions, and in informing the decisions of domestic courts. 4 While
acknowledging this large body of literature, this article focuses on
the role that international environmental law actually does play
in one aspect of domestic environmental law: how domestic courts
have interpreted and applied international environmental law.
This article seeks to contribute a few observations to the
growing body of literature5 on domestic application of interna-
tional environmental law. First, actual practice does not comport
with the traditional monist-dualist theory regarding the role of in-
ternational law in domestic contexts. Second, domestic courts
have used international environmental law for a wide range of
purposes and in various contexts. Third, considering the rapidly
4. See, e.g., Dorit Talitman et al., The Devil is in the Details: Increasing Interna-
tional Law's Influence on Domestic Environmental Performance-The Case of Israel
and the Mediterranean Sea, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 414 (2003); Joel B. Eisen, From
Stockholm to Kyoto and Back to the United States: International Law's Effect on Do-
mestic Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1435 (1999); Philippe Sands, The Greening of Interna-
tional Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293 (1994).
More generally, there is a rich body of legal scholarship exploring the application
of international law by domestic courts. See, e.g., L. ERADES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE CASE LAW STUDY (Malgosia
Fitzmaurice & Cees Flinterman eds., 1993) (surveying 2000 cases from common law
and civil law systems around the world); see generally INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS
IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
In addition, scholarship has addressed the converse question: how domestic law
can influence the development of international law. See e.g., ELIZABETH R. DESOM-
BRE, DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INDUSTRY, ENVI-
RONMENTALISTS, AND U.S. POWER (2000) (highlighting ways in which domestic
environmental regulations help to shape international environmental law and
institutions).
5. See, e.g., Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501 (2000); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NA-
TIONAL COURTS (Michael Anderson & Paolo Galizzi eds., 2002); INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (Alice Palmer & Cairo A.R. Robb eds., 2005).
See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 4.
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growing body of case law in this area and the frequent (if not nec-
essarily consistent) discrepancy between practice and theory, it
may be time to revisit the underlying legal theory regarding dis-
tinctions between monist and dualist systems.
Section I provides a brief overview of the theory regarding the
role of international law in domestic courts, while noting that the
practice is not so clear. Section II examines the various ways that
domestic courts have interpreted and applied international envi-
ronmental law. Section III explores the ambiguity in how domes-
tic courts have applied international environmental law, some of
the limitations on such application, and prospects for further de-
velopment. Section IV provides a few concluding thoughts.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset, it is important to note that the primary respon-
sibility for developing, implementing, and enforcing international
environmental law rests with the legislative and executive
branches of government. In most countries, the executive branch
negotiates and signs international agreements, and the legislative
branch ratifies the agreements.6 Both branches are responsible
for articulating laws (legislative and executive), regulations (exec-
utive), and rules (executive) that govern conduct, including those
set forth in international environmental agreements to which the
country has agreed to be bound. The executive branch is also re-
sponsible for enforcing such implementing legislation, regula-
tions, and rules, as well as reporting to the COPs of the respective
agreements regarding progress made in implementation.
Generally speaking, domestic courts interpret and decide
cases dealing with domestic law, including those laws that imple-
ment international environmental law. In most cases they are
still interpreting and applying domestic law.7 From time to time,
though, courts are called upon to interpret, apply, or otherwise
use international environmental law. This may be because the
relevant domestic law is vague, and international law can help in
6. In some countries, the constitution provides that the executive branch may
"adopt" an agreement, and this adoption binds the country in the same way that rati-
fication does. See, e.g., ICE. CONST. art. 21; IR. CONST. art. 29(4.1), (4.2); JoRDAN
CONST. art. 33; Russ. FED. CONST. art 86.
7. Occasionally, international agreements reference the use of national courts as
a forum in which to hear enforcement cases. See, e.g., Treaty Respecting Utilization
of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944,
U.S.-Mexico, art. 24(c), 59 Stat. 1219; Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Ques-




interpreting or applying domestic provisions. Alternatively, the
relevant domestic law may have gaps, and international environ-
mental law speaks to a particular gap, providing an interpretive
aid (particularly where the domestic law seeks to implement in-
ternational environmental law), or even a cause of action. In
other instances, reference to international environmental law may
be necessary when the domestic implementing legislation or regu-
lations are challenged (for instance, as being ultra vires).
From the perspective of a domestic court, is international law,
including international environmental law, "law"? Can the court
enforce it? Can it be used as an interpretive aid in deciding do-
mestic cases? Or is international law the sole purview of the exec-
utive and legislative branches of government? The answer-at
least according to traditional legal theory-is that it depends on
the country.
There are two basic approaches that countries have adopted
with regard to the domestic legal force of international law: mon-
ist and dualist.8 In the monist system, international law is part of
the domestic law of the country. In many monist countries, inter-
national law enjoys a higher priority than domestic legislation
and regulations, while in some monist countries domestic law is at
the same level as or higher than international legislation. 9 Thus,
once a country ratifies, accedes, or otherwise becomes a party to
an international agreement, that agreement is a part of the law of
the land: It is directly applicable. In a dualist system, interna-
tional law is on a different plane from domestic law, and imple-
menting legislation is necessary for international law to have
legal force within a country. So, if a country with a dualist system
ratifies an international agreement, it incurs obligations vis-A-vis
other countries, but that international law has no effect on the
ground until the country passes implementing legislation (some-
times referred to as the "act of transformation"). 1o There are a few
8. For a review of the legal theory regarding monist and dualist systems, see
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESS 253-58
(2002); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 31-53 (6th ed.
2003). For a listing of European countries adhering to monist and dualist theories,
see Privacy in Research Ethics & Law (PRIVIREAL), Countries Adhering to "Mon-
ism" or "Dualism," available at http://72.14.207.104/u/privireal?q=cache:FiPVcJIbc
DYJ:www.privireal.org/monism.htm+monist&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=l&ie=UTF-
8 (cached by Google July 19, 2005).
9. See Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in
NATIONAL TREATY LAw AND PRACTICE 1, 47-49 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005).
10. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A
Policy Analysis, 86 AM J. INT'L L. 310 (1992).
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variations on these two basic approaches.11 With some excep-
tions, common law countries have tended to adopt some form of
dualist system, while French, Spanish, and Dutch civil law coun-
tries have tended to adopt some form of monist system.
As the cases cited in this article illustrate, though, practice
often does not comport with theory. In practice, judges in many
monist countries frequently are reluctant to apply international
environmental law, 12 and in dualist countries, judges often look at
international environmental law.13 In dualist countries, judges
may apply principles of customary international law, or they may
apply agreements that have been ratified but have not been imple-
mented. In these instances, the judicial decisions particularly re-
semble those of courts in monist countries.
II. EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION BY DOMESTIC
COURTS
While the monist-dualist dichotomy suggests that interna-
tional law is either irrelevant or a legitimate source of law for do-
mestic courts, the reality is more nuanced. As this section
illustrates, domestic courts ostensibly following both systems have
invoked international environmental agreements and principles
in a variety of contexts. In many if not most instances, though,
the status accorded the particular international norm relied on is
ambiguous. It is unclear whether the Court is treating the partic-
ular provision or instrument of international environmental law
may be compulsory, persuasive, or simply adding weight to a deci-
sion that rests primarily (if not exclusively) on application of do-
mestic law-the "kitchen sink" argument. That is, a court may
cite many bases, including international environmental law, for a
11. For example, the United States has adopted a hybrid approach that requires a
treaty to be self-executing in order for a domestic court to apply it, as discussed infra
at notes 149-50 and accompanying text. Some other monist countries have adopted a
similar approach regarding whether a treaty is self-executing in order for it to be
directly applicable. See Directorate of International Law, Relation Between Interna-
tional and Domestic Law, available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/sub-dipl/e/home/
thema/intlaw/relat.html (last visited May 3, 2006).
12. E.g., Tepulolo v. Pou, [2005] TVHC 1, Case No. 17 of 2003 (High Court of
Tuvalu, Fain. App. J. Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.pacii.org/tv/cases/
TVHC/2005/1.html (last visited May 8, 2006) (holding that although Tuvalu follows a
monist system and was party to both the Convention on Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
no implementing legislation had been adopted and the Court refused to apply the
agreements in a custody dispute, stating only that "the aims of an international con-
vention may be relevant in the interpretation of existing laws of Tuvalu").
13. See, e.g., infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
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certain proposition so that the reference to international environ-
mental law is the legal equivalent of "tossing in the kitchen sink."
To the extent that domestic courts have invoked international
environmental law, the law has usually been what is termed
"hard" law: either binding international instruments or custom-
ary international law. 14 The international instruments may be bi-
lateral, regional, or multilateral, and they include conventions,
treaties, agreements, and protocols. The body of customary inter-
national environmental law may be discerned through two ele-
ments: state action and opinio juris, which is the belief that the
state action is obligatory and undertaken because it is required by
international law.15
The cases discussed in this article reference, in one way or
another, a wide range of treaty law. 16 They also reference a vari-
ety of principles of international environmental law.' 7 While
14. For a discussion of the basics of "soft law" and "hard law," see Pierre-Marie
Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L.
420 (1991). See also Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding
"Soft Law," 30 McGILL L.J. 37 (1984); G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 187-91 (1983).
15. In addition to treaty law and customary international law, some scholars have
argued that there is a class of law that may be termed "declarative" or "declaratory"
international law. See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The
Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (1991); Daniel
Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 112 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2604, 2641 (1997); Mark A. Drumbl,
Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REV.
843, 949-51 (2002); William L. Schachte, Jr. & J. Peter A. Bernhardt, International
Straits and Navigational Freedoms, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 527 (1993); Stephen A. Rosen-
baum, Pro Bono Publico Meets Droits de l'Homme: Speaking a New Legal Language,
13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 499 (1991). These scholars argue that much of what
is asserted to be customary international law does not actually have the necessary
state action to be truly customary international law. Nevertheless, the argument
goes, the norms are consistently repeated time and again in various international
declarations and other instruments. The frequent and consistent use of such norms
without repudiation is thus argued to entail a body of binding norms that is not cus-
tomary, but rather declaratory. The specific cases examined in this article do not
appear to take a position on such law.
16. These include the World Heritage Convention; the Aarhus Convention;
CITES; the Ramsar Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity; the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD); the Bern Convention; the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS); the Oslo Dumping Convention; the London Dumping Convention; the In-
ternational Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); and
the Migratory Bird Treaties.
17. These include the precautionary principle, polluter-pays principle, principle of
prevention, principle of intergenerational equity, and the principle of sustainable
development.
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scholars often argue that one or more of these principles consti-
tute principles of customary international law, 18 there remains
significant disagreement regarding the legal status of certain
principles, particularly the precautionary principle (Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development).19 The
key point for this article is that domestic courts have frequently
cited these principles in their decisions.
In some instances, this article considers examples from
human rights law. In practice, the domestic case law applying in-
ternational human rights law (including genocide, rights of wo-
men, and rights of children) often emerged earlier and is more
developed than domestic case law applying international environ-
mental law.
Domestic cases cite international environmental law in at
least eight contexts. These include (1) upholding domestic legisla-
tion or regulations, (2) upholding other governmental or adminis-
trative actions, (3) voiding governmental actions, (4) constraining
the scope of domestic laws or regulations, (5) challenging actions
by a private party, (6) assisting in interpreting domestic legal and
regulatory provisions that are either vague or complex, (7) as a
normative cause of action, and (8) for procedural matters such as
judicial review and standing. Each of these eight contexts is con-
sidered in turn.
A. Upholding Domestic Legislation or Regulations
Some courts have invoked international environmental law to
uphold domestic legislative or regulatory actions. For countries in
which the constitution accords the national government plenary
authority to enact laws (and by extension regulations) for the pub-
lic good, such use of international environmental law may be un-
necessary. However, in federal countries in which the
constitution allocates certain authorities to the national level and
certain authorities to the state or provincial level (and sometimes
even authorities to the municipal level), there may be the issue of
18. E.g., NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL
SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES (2002) (focusing on the evolution and application of the
polluter pays principle, the principle of prevention, and the precautionary principle);
Charmian Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emer-
gence in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 509
(1998).
19. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development (UNCED), June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.




whether a particular level of government has the authority to
adopt a particular piece of legislation can, and does, arise. Even
when the legislation in question implements a multilateral envi-
ronmental agreement, there is the issue as to whether the subject
matter is exclusively the purview of another level of government,
and thus whether the national government could subvert the con-
stitutional allocation of powers by entering into an international
agreement to regulate certain actions that would normally be re-
served to the states or provinces.
Australia, Canada, and the United States (all federal coun-
tries) have all used international environmental law to justify leg-
islative initiatives, particularly at the federal level. The High
Court of Australia in the Tasmanian Dams case 20 held that the
federal World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, which imple-
mented the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), was a valid
exercise of the federal government's external affairs power.
In Canada, courts have relied on international environmental
law to uphold legislative actions at both the federal and municipal
levels. 21 In 114957 Canada Ltde (Spraytech, Socigtg d'arrosage) v.
Hudson (Town),22 (Spraytech), the Canadian Supreme Court up-
held the authority of a municipality to regulate the spraying of
pesticides. In Spraytech, lawn-care and landscaping companies
were charged with using pesticides in such a way that violated a
municipal bylaw. The companies held permits that were approved
under the federal Pest Control Products Act and Quebec's Pesti-
cides Act. In 1991, however, the town of Hudson adopted a bylaw
referencing the precautionary principle that restricted the use of
pesticides within its perimeter to specified locations and for enu-
merated activities. As such, the bylaw altered the conditions
under which the landscaping companies held their permits. The
appellants appealed, asserting that the bylaw was ultra vires be-
20. Commonwealth of Austl. v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dams case), (1983) 158
C.L.R. 1, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/21.html (last
visited May 8, 2006); see also Donald R. Rothwell & Ben Boer, International Environ-
mental Law and Australian Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NA-
TIONAL COURTs 23 (Anderson & Galizzi eds.), supra note 5, at 28 (describing the case
as "the pivotal decision by the [Australian] High Court in regard to the extent of the
treaties aspect of the external affairs power").
21. See generally Jerry V. DeMarco & Michelle L. Campbell, The Supreme Court
of Canada's Progressive Use of International Environmental Law and Policy in Inter-
preting Domestic Legislation, 13 REV. EuR. CMTY. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 320 (2004).
22. 114957 Canada Lte (Spraytech, Soci6t6 d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001]
2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 S.C.C. 40.
4312006]
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cause it did not fall within the enumerated objectives for which
towns may adopt bylaws.
In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada inter-
preted the precautionary principle and looked to it in upholding
the municipality's authority to enact the bylaw restricting the use
of pesticides. In justifying application of the precautionary princi-
ple, the Court favorably cited an earlier decision, which stated
that "the values reflected in international human rights law may
help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation
and judicial review." 23 The Court also quoted Driedger on the Con-
struction of Statutes:
[T]he legislature is presumed to respect the values and princi-
ples enshrined in international law, both customary and con-
ventional. These constitute a part of the legal context in which
legislation is enacted and read. In so far as possible, therefore,
interpretations that reflect these values and principles are pre-
ferred. [Emphasis added by the Court.]24
Writing for the majority, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 noted that
Canada had "advocated inclusion of the precautionary principle"
during negotiations of the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on
Sustainable Development and that the principle was "codified in
several items of domestic legislation."25 The Court favorably cited
scholarship and case law of India that supported a conclusion that
the precautionary principle may be considered customary interna-
tional law.26
The Court concluded that "In the context of the precautionary
principle's tenets, the Town's concerns about pesticides fit well
under their rubric of preventive action."27 The Court upheld the
bylaw and the town's authority to adopt such a bylaw under the
"general welfare" provision of the federal Cities and Towns Act.28
23. Id. para. 30 (citing Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 861).
24. Id. (quoting RUTH SULLIVAN, DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 53
(3d ed. 1994)).
25. Id. para. 31.
26. Id. para. 32 ("The Supreme Court of India considers the precautionary princi-
ple to be 'part of the Customary International Law'" (quoting A.P. Pollution Control
Board v. Nayudu, 1999 S.O.L. No.53, at 8)); see also Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v.
Union of India, (1996) Supp. 5 S.C.R. 241.
27. 114957 Canada Ltfe (Spraytech, Socift6 d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town) [2001]
2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 S.C.C. 40. para. 32.
28. Id. paras. 18-31.
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The Court also noted that the bylaw was consistent with interna-
tional law and policies. 29
It should be noted that the Court did not rely on the precau-
tionary principle as the sole foundation, or even the primary rea-
son, for justifying the bylaw. Before addressing the precautionary
principle, the Court noted that the bylaw could be justified as pro-
tecting the health and welfare of the town's inhabitants. 30 The
analysis of the precautionary principle thus buttressed the analy-
sis of the domestic prerogatives. It is more than a kitchen-sink
argument thrown in with other justifications to support the up-
holding of the bylaw. In this context, consideration of principles of
international environmental law may be important as an interpre-
tive tool: Although the Court's interpretation of domestic law was
reasonable, some might view it as involving a not-insignificant ex-
ercise of judicial discretion. Accordingly, principles of interna-
tional environmental law-such as the precautionary principle-
can provide an important metric by which to assess the manner in
which a court exercises its discretion.
The other factor that may have influenced the determination
in the Spraytech case is that the Court was asked neither to af-
firmatively create an obligation from international environmental
law, nor to invalidate a law or other government action. In prac-
tice-and sometimes by judicial canon-courts often are reluctant
to take such measures, preferring that the legislative and execu-
tive branches, as popularly elected representatives, decide such
matters. Instead, the Court was called upon to decide whether a
government action (in this case, a municipal bylaw) was
legitimate.
Ultimately, Spraytech is significant because it is the first time
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the precautionary
principle may be (but is not necessarily) a principle of customary
international law.31 As such, the precautionary principle may
provide guidance in interpreting Canadian environmental
statutes.
In R. v. Crown Zellerbach,32 the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the federal government had the authority to enact the
Ocean Dumping Control Act, which implemented the London
29. Id. para. 30.
30. Id. para. 29.
31. See Envtl. Appeal Bd., B.C., Appeal No. 2001-PES-003(a) 11 (June 17-20,
2002), available at http://www.eab.gov.bc.ca/pest/2001pes003a.pdf.
32. R. v. Crown Zellerbach Can. Ltd., [1988] S.C.R. 401.
433
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Dumping Convention. The precise role of international environ-
mental law in this case, however, was inconclusive.
In the United States, the use of international law by domestic
courts is a subject of active academic and judicial debate. 33 As a
practical matter, international environmental law has served as a
basis for decisions in a number of cases. In Missouri v. Holland,34
the State of Missouri sought to prevent a federal game warden
from enforcing the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).35
The state argued that wildlife, including migratory birds, were the
traditional purview of the states, and thus the MBTA was an un-
constitutional infringement of rights reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. Moreover, the state argued that the un-
derlying treaty was invalid, because "there are limits . . .to the
treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act
of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers re-
served to the States, a treaty cannot do."36
In a decision authored by Justice Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the 1916 Migratory Bird Treaty,37 the MBTA, and
33. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004). In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006), the Court held that Military Commissions established by the United States to
try people for "acts of international terrorism" violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and thus were illegal. Id. at
2786. While the majority voided the Commissions on parallel grounds-as violating
the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions-it explicitly held that the Geneva Conven-
tions were judicially enforceable by private individuals. Id. at 2796-97. The dissents
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, illustrate that the role of international law in
U.S. Courts remains a contentious issue.
In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
death penalty was a disproportionate penalty for those under eighteen years of age
when they committed their crime. The Court grounded its argument on Eighth
Amendment considerations, but also considered the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(which the United States had not ratified). The Court noted that its decision was not
guided by international law, but it was in conformity with it. The majority "acknowl-
edge[d] the overwhelming weight of international opinion" that "provide[s] respected
and significant confirmation of [the Court's] conclusions." Id. at 578. While Justice
O'Connor disagreed with the holding, she agreed with the consideration of foreign and
international law, noting that "Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of
evolving standards of decency." Id. at 604. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that
foreign law was irrelevant to the Court's opinion, unless it forms the basis for the
judgment. Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
35. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 65 Cong. ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (July 3, 1918).
36. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432.




accompanying regulations were not an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on state authority to regulate wildlife within a state's bor-
ders. In particular, the court noted that:
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not
lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action,
'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government' is not to be found.38
The Court noted that the treaty did not violate any specific term of
the Constitution and that its subject matter (namely, migratory
birds) was transitory by nature.39 Notwithstanding the role that
states traditionally play in governing wildlife, the Court observed
that the national interest involved was "of very nearly the first
magnitude," that "[ilt can be protected only by national action in
concert with that of another power," and that "[blut for the treaty
and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to
deal with."40 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the validity of the
treaty and the MBTA that implements the treaty.41
These cases highlight some of the disputes that may arise be-
tween national and subnational competences, especially in federal
countries. In addition, the Spraytech case also illustrates the pos-
sible role of international environmental law in addressing issues
of competence of municipalities to enact implementing legislation.
B. Upholding Administrative Actions
A number of courts have invoked international environmental
law in upholding various administrative actions. Such actions in-
clude, for example, the designation of World Heritage Sites, the
refusal of applications for development, and the establishment of
commissions.
A series of Australian cases has considered governmental ac-
tions related to the management of World Heritage Sites. In the
38. Id. at 433 (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)).
39. Id. at 434-35.
40. Id. at 435.
41. Id. The progeny of Missouri v. Holland includes Palila v. Hawaii Department
of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979) (holding that en-
forcement of the Endangered Species Act is not restricted by the Tenth Amendment,
even with respect to a species that is endemic to a state, both because of the Con-
gress's power to enact legislation to implement valid treaties and because of Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce).
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Tasmanian Dams case,42 the High Court upheld the designation
of World Heritage Sites and the government's refusal to issue an
application for development. 43 Similarly, in the Tasmanian For-
ests case,44 the Court upheld the establishment of a commission to
investigate values of proposed World Heritage Sites and the appli-
cation of interim protection measures.
Two cases from the United States and United Kingdom high-
light the use and limitations of international environmental law.
Both cases dealt with the importation of big-leaf mahogany, a spe-
cies listed under CITES. 45 In each case, mahogany shipments
were accompanied by documentation required under CITES; and
in each case, questions were raised regarding the legitimacy of the
documentation.
In Castlewood Products, LLC v. Norton (Castlewood),46 the
Brazilian government informed the U.S. Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) that the permits accompanying sev-
eral shipment of big-leaf mahogany may have been illegally ob-
tained. APHIS responded by seizing the shipment, and the
importer sued. The District Court for the District of Columbia
held that agencies may impose requirements above and beyond
those set forth by CITES, especially when an agency may doubt
compliance with CITES.4 7 Thus, the court held that compliance
with the specific terms of the Convention was not necessarily suf-
ficient for APHIS to allow the shipment to enter the country. In
reaching its decision, the court considered the text and intent of
CITES as well as decisions of the COP. 48 COP decisions generally
are considered soft law and are not necessarily binding, so this
case is also significant for its use of soft law.
In contrast, in Greenpeace v. Secretary of State for the Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (Greenpeace),49 England's cus-
42. Commonwealth of Austl. v. Tasmania (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1, available at http:/!
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/21.html (last visited May 8, 2006).
43. Id. at 146-53.
44. Richardson v. Forestry Comm'n, 164 C.L.R. 261 (1988) available at http:/!
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/10.html (last visited May 11, 2006).
45. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, app. III, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 I.L.M 1088, available at http://
www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml (last visited May 8, 2006).
46. Castlewoods Prods. v. Norton, 264 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003), af/d, 365 F.3d
1076 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
47. Castlewoods Prods., 264 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13.
48. Id. at 12 (citing specific CITES Resolutions).
49. R (on the application of Greenpeace) v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, Food &




toms service, Her Majesty's Commissioners of Customs and Excise
(the Commissioners), recognized that there were questions re-
garding the validity of the Brazilian export permits, but felt con-
strained by the terms of CITES: The shipment was accompanied
by what appeared to be a valid export permit that was consistent
with CITES (if not necessarily local law), so the Commissioners
did not believe that they had the authority to seize the ship-
ment.50 Greenpeace brought suit to compel seizure. In Green-
peace, the majority held that in order for there to be certainty in
business, the government needed to accept documents that are on
their face proper.51 In dissent, Justice Laws argued that the gov-
ernment could rely either on documentary evidence (i.e., the ex-
port permit) or on both documentary evidence as well as
substantive provisions of CITES; because this was an environ-
mental protection measure, he advocated the latter approach. 52
The Castlewood and Greenpeace cases are easily reconciled:
In both cases, the court accorded a measure of deference to the
respective governmental actions. 53 In Castlewood, where the
agency went beyond the specific text of the convention, the court
upheld the action, particularly where such action was consistent
with and pursuant to a COP decision. In Greenpeace, the Court
upheld the government's action where the agency accepted the
permit on its face pursuant to the terms of the Convention. In
both cases, the courts looked to the underlying convention and the
implementing legislation. While the District Court for the District
of Columbia also considered a non-binding COP decision, the key
element in both cases appears to be the agency's efforts to comply
with the text of the Convention. In contrast with the cases dis-
cussed in the following two subsections, which voided or con-
strained government action, the agencies in Castlewood and
Greenpeace both appeared to comply with the Convention.
50. Id.
51. Id. para. 61.
52. Id. para. 33. Justice Laws noted that "The interpretation of statutes is never
entirely value-free." Id.
53. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Coal
Contractors Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, (1994) 68 P. & C.R. 285 (Q.B.D. 1993)
(upholding agency action under the World Heritage Convention).
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C. Voiding Governmental Action or Compelling
Governmental Action
In most countries, cases that challenge governmental action
or inaction can be difficult to win, and this is all the more so when
the claim is based on international law. Nevertheless, a number
of courts have voided governmental actions that were counter to
international environmental law. Similarly, some courts have
compelled governments to take action required by international
law. A description of a few of these cases follows.
In Humane Society of the United States v. Glickman, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit voided the U.S. Department
of Agriculture's integrated goose management plan.54 As part of
its plan, the USDA intended, among other measures, to kill Ca-
nada geese without first obtaining a permit from the Department
of the Interior.5 5 The court held that the USDA's failure to obtain
a permit violated the MBTA. 56 The court explained that the
MBTA implements the Migratory Bird Treaty entered into be-
tween the United States and Canada.57 If the Canadian govern-
ment slaughtered migratory birds in Canada without a permit, it
would violate the treaty.58 Thus, if a federal agency in the United
States did the same, it too would violate the treaty.59 The court
found that there was no reason to treat the MBTA differently from
the treaty, given that the MBTA was meant to give effect to the
treaty.60 Although the court focused on whether the plan violated
the implementing act-the MBTA-its analysis relied on the re-
ciprocal nature of obligations under the treaty. Indeed, the sub-
stantive analysis relied as much on what constitutes a violation of
the treaty as it did on what constitutes a violation of the MBTA.
Two Dutch cases offer additional examples of domestic courts'
reliance on international environmental law in cases against the
government. In the first case, a local non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) successfully challenged a government land use plan,
the implementation of which would have resulted in harm to a
54. Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
55. Id. at 884.
56. Id. at 888.
57. Id. at 887.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The treaty-the International Convention for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, 39 Stat. 1702 (1 916)-is the same as the treaty at issue in Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920), discussed supra at notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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salamander population; the NGO's claim rested on the assertion
that the plan violated the Bern Convention.61 In the second Dutch
case, the court held that a plan by the province of Gelderland to
build a hotel did not take sufficient account of the potential harm
to badger habitat, which was protected under the Bern
Convention. 62
In Vellore Citizens Welfare Reform v. Union of India (Vellore),
an NGO brought suit against the government of India to protect
public health from the leather and tannery industries. 63 The
NGO challenged governmental inaction, asserting that the failure
to protect public health violated principles of customary interna-
tional law. The Supreme Court of India recognized the signifi-
cance of the leather industry to the country's economy, but also
considered the long-term health and environmental impacts of
how the industry was run.64 To balance these interests, the Court
considered the concept of sustainable development. 65 Within the
rubric of sustainable development, the Court took judicial notice
of the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle as
principles of customary international law. 66 Accordingly, the two
principles were accepted as part of Indian domestic law.67 Vellore
is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, in contrast to the
other cases in this section, the Court in Vellore relied on principles
of customary international environmental law, rather than on
specific treaties or other forms of hard law. Further, the Court
relied on these principles to compel government action where the
61. Herpetologische Studiegroep Gelderland v. Provincial Executive Gelderland,
Council of State, Admin. Justice Div., 22 Ap 1991, AB 1991, No. 592, cited in Daniel
Bodansky & Jutta Brunn~e, The Role of National Courts in the Field of International
Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 1
(Anderson & Galizzi eds.), supra note 5, at n.94 and accompanying text. For another
Dutch case relying on the Bern Convention, see G.J.P. Ziers v. Provincial Executive
Gelderland, Council of State, Admin. Justice Div. AB 1995, cited in Bodansky & Brun-
n6e, supra, nn.55, 72.
62. See Andr6 Nollkaemper, International Environmental Law in the Courts of the
Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (Anderson
& Gallizi eds.), supra note 5, at 187 (noting that in this case, the Bern Convention
served largely as an interpretive aid).
63. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India et al., [1996] Supp. 5 S.C.C.
647, available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICHRL/1996/62.html (last visited
May 9, 2006).
64. Id. para. 9.
65. Id. para. 10.
66. Id. paras. 11-12.
67. Id. para. 14 (concluding that "In view of constitutional and statutory provi-
sions we have no hesitation in holding that the Precautionary Principle and the Pol-
luter Pays Principle are part of the environmental law of the country.").
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government had previously refused to act, thus extending the re-
view of government actions to also cover government inaction.
In Georgia, the Aarhus Convention 68 motivated a landmark
case that compelled governmental action. Georgia was an early
party to the Aarhus Convention, signing it on June 25, 1998 and
ratifying it on April 11, 2000.69 Under Georgian law, an interna-
tional agreement must be officially published in the Parliamen-
tary Herald in order for it to have direct legal effect.70 Yet, more
than three years after ratifying the Convention, the government
still had not officially published it. A public interest environmen-
tal lawyer challenged the governmental inaction. The Court of
Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District of Tbilisi ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, ordering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to present the
Convention to the Parliament of Georgia and the Parliament to
officially publish the Convention. 71
Australia,72  the Philippines, 73  the United Kingdom, 74
68. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), June 25, 1998,
38 I.L.M. 517 (1999), available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf.
69. See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Aarhus Con-
vention, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ratification.htm (last visited May 9, 2006).
70. See UNECE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, ENVIRONMENTAL PER-
FORMANCE REVIEWS: GEORGIA 43 (2003), available at http://www.countryanalyticwork.
net/CAW/Cawdoclib.nsf/viewSampleDocsdisp/1A46A8B40CFD3B7A85256DFA0050C
911/$file/georgia.pdf. A variety of common law and civil law countries require official
publication for an international agreement to have direct effect. The publication is
not necessarily tied to the development of implementing legislation, although such a
provision may grant the government time to amend domestic legislation to be consis-
tent with the country's commitments under the international agreement.
71. E-mail from Merab Barbakadze, lead counsel (Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing the decision of the Court of Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District of Thlisi,
Nov. 2003).
72. E.g., Leatch v. Dir. Gen. Nat'l Parks & Wildlife, [1993] NSWLEC 191 (Land
and Environment Court of New S. Wales (1993)) 81 L.G.E.R.A. 270, 1993 WL 1405558
(New S. Wales Nov. 23, 1993), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/
NSWLEC/1993/191.html (last visited May 11, 2006) (considering the precautionary
principle in holding that a permit to construct a road and bridge could not take or kill
endangered frogs during the project's development); Greenpeace Austl. Ltd. v.
Redbank Power Co. Pty Ltd. [1994] NSWLEC 178 (Land and Environment Court of
New S. Wales (1994), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWLEC/
1994/178.htm (last visited May 11, 2006); (1994) 86 L.G.E.R.A. 143, 1994 WL 1657428
(New S. Wales Nov. 10, 1994) (holding that the precautionary principle required a
cautious approach, but that greenhouse issues do not necessarily outweigh other is-
sues when considering whether to grant a license to construct a power station and
ancillary facilities).
73. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083. (Aug. 9, 1993). (Phil.), available at httpi/
www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=278 (last visited May 9, 2006) (intergenera-
tional equity); see also Antonio G.M. La Vifia, The Right to a Sound Environment in
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/5
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Pakistan, 75 and other countries have also invoked international
environmental law in cases that have challenged governmental
action, particularly administrative actions. As discussed in sec-
tion III.B below, however, the precise role that the courts accord
international environmental law in these decisions often is
ambiguous.
D. Constraining the Scope of Domestic Laws or
Regulations
In a few instances, courts have held that international envi-
ronmental law limits the ability of the legislature or the executive
branch to promulgate laws and regulations. For instance, in
Alaska Fish and Wildlife Federation v. Dunkle, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of the Interior could
adopt regulations that permitted subsistence hunting, but only to
the extent that such hunting was allowed by migratory bird trea-
ties.76 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered Species Scientific
Authority, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals voided federal guide-
lines for granting permits to export bobcat pelts because it found
that the guidelines failed to meet the requirements of CITES.7 7 In
these instances, the courts limited agency attempts to go beyond
the international agreements, largely because the agency actions
would have undermined the environmental goals of the relevant
agreements.
In contrast, courts have upheld agency actions that go beyond
an international agreement where the action furthers the agree-
ment's environmental goals. In two Italian cases, the government
instituted criminal prosecutions for marine pollution against sev-
eral private parties. The charges were based on Italian legislation
the Philippines: The Significance of the Minors Oposa Case, 3 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY
& INT'L ENVTL. L. 246 (1994).
74. R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Duddridge and
Others, [1996] Env. L.R. 325 (A.C.) (1995) (U.K.) (considering the precautionary prin-
ciple but refusing to compel a minister to issue regulations restricting electromagnetic
fields from electric power cables).
75. Zia v. WAPDA, Human Rights Case No. 15-K (Pak. 1992), available at httpj/
www.elaw.org./resources/printable.asp?id=280 (last visited May 9, 2006) (examining
the precautionary principle and the 1992 Rio Declaration in holding that a proposed
electric grid station should "make such adjustments, alterations, or additions which
may ensure safety and security or at least minimize the possible hazards" from elec-
tromagnetic radiation).
76. 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d
168, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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that implemented MARPOL. 78 The defendants claimed that the
domestic Italian legislation went beyond the specific terms of
MARPOL by prohibiting certain actions that MARPOL did not.
Accordingly, they argued, the Italian legislation was ultra vires,
because it went beyond the specific terms of MARPOL by prohibit-
ing certain actions that MARPOL did not. The courts rejected
these arguments, holding that the Convention allowed stricter na-
tional rules, and found the defendants guilty.7 9
Together, these cases highlight the general principle that na-
tional implementing legislation cannot be less protective than the
relevant international environmental agreement, but national
rules usually can be more protective if countries so desire. It is
worth noting that some international environmental agreements
do not permit more restrictive national legislation, but these
agreements are in the minority.80 Generally speaking then, inter-
national environmental law can serve as the floor, but not the
ceiling.
E. Challenging Actions by a Private Party
Traditionally, international law has governed the actions of
nations, not individuals, businesses, or organizations. Increas-
ingly, however, international law has begun to address actions by
individuals and other non-governmental actors. Since the
Nuremburg Trials following World War II, it has been well estab-
lished that human rights law and the law of war can apply di-
rectly to individual private actors.8 ' Considering the diffuse
actions underlying many contemporary environmental chal-
lenges-from land degradation to trade in endangered species,
ozone-depleting substances, and hazardous waste to loss of
habitat for biodiversity-international environmental agreements
78. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), adopted Feb. 17,
1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 & 1341 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 546.
79. Paolo Galizzi & Chiara Giorgetti, The Application of International Environ-
mental Obligations in Italian Courts, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NA-
TIONAL CouRTs (Anderson & Galizzi eds.), supra note 5, at 167.
80. Cf. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 190,
art. XXIV(5)(b) (providing that the "duties and other regulations of commerce main-
tained in each of the constituent territories... shall not be higher or more restrictive"
than those maintained before the formation of the free-trade area).
81. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995) ("'Individuals may be
held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and
genocide'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES pt.II, introductory note (1986))).
442 [Vol. 23
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/5
2006] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
have started to address a wide range of activities by non-state ac-
tors. Nevertheless, cases challenging actions by private parties
rarely rely on international environmental law. 2
Courts often hold that international environmental law is
made between states, that it creates obligations of states to other
states, and that a lack of "direct effect" limits the application of
international agreements to private parties.88 Nevertheless, some
of the cases discussed above have applied laws or regulations im-
plementing international environmental law to private parties. In
some instances, such as Spraytech and the Italian MARPOL
cases, 4 private parties have challenged the authority of the gov-
ernment to develop or impose these domestic measures. In such
circumstances, however, courts have little difficulty upholding the
legislative and executive measures or actions.
Additionally, there are a few cases where courts have directly
applied international environmental law to private parties. For
instance, the Australian case Booth v. Bosworth involved a suit
against the owners of a lychee orchard in Queensland. The
orchard owners had installed an electric fence, which was killing
spectacled flying foxes.8 5 The Federal Court held that the owners
had thereby violated Australia's commitments under the World
Heritage Convention to protect biodiversity in the Wet Tropics
World Heritage Area.8 6 Thus, Booth is an example of a case where
international environmental law was invoked against a private in-
dividual; it probably helped that the case focused on enforcing do-
mestic legislation that implemented the World Heritage
Convention and did not entail direct application of the Convention
to private actions.
82. See Bodansky & Brunn6e, supra note 61, at 19.
83. E.g., Case C236/92, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava v
Regions Lombardia, 1990 E.C.R. 1-00483 (holding that an EU directive regarding haz-
ardous waste did not confer rights on individuals as against states). In contrast,
when international agreements protect individuals from state action, as in the human
rights context, courts have been more willing to hold that the agreements have direct
effect. See, e.g., infra note 153 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 21-29 and 78-79 and accompanying text.
85. Booth v. Bosworth (2001) 114 F.C.R. 39 (Austl.), available at http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthfederalct/2001/1453.html (last visited May 9, 2006).
86. Id. para. 107.
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F. Assisting in Interpreting Domestic Law
Courts use international environmental law to aid in inter-
preting domestic law that is vague or complex.8 7 Courts do so in
one of two ways: by either looking to the international law for defi-
nitions for terms used in domestic law, or by interpreting substan-
tive legal provisions in accordance with international law.
1. Providing Definitions
Three cases illustrate how international environmental law
can assist in defining terms of domestic law. Recently, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice sought to determine whether scrap metal
that was recycled and resold was a "waste" for the purposes of reg-
ulation.88 The Court held that the international environmental
principles of prevention and precaution required taking a broad
definitional scope of the term.8 9 Thus, the Court used these prin-
ciples of international environmental law to define what consti-
tutes "waste."
The Supreme Court of Poland faced the question of what con-
stitutes a "legal secret" in a case that sought to compel production
of government-held documents.90 The Court was reluctant to
grant a broad definition of legal secret, and it held that the only
basis on which documents could be exempted from disclosure as a
"legal secret" was when it was provided in the constitution or
under international law. This was shortly after Poland had
signed the Aarhus Convention, 91 which includes detailed provi-
sions regarding what constitutes a secret. While the Court did not
go on to define the specific parameters of a "legal secret," it estab-
lished the precedent that international law was one of the key ele-
ments in deciding the breadth (or narrowness) of the term. The
Court thus opened the door to applying the Aarhus Convention in
interpreting the scope of public access to environmental
information.
87. See, e.g., Nollkaemper, supra note 62, at 188-91 ("there is a rich practice of
courts using international environmental law to give effect to interpret provisions of
national law"); Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 859-60 (1989).
88. Case C-444/00, R. (on the application of Mayer Parry Recycling Limited) v.
Environment Agency, [2004] Env. L.R. 6 (Eur. Ct. of Justice June 19, 2003).
89. Id. paras. A100, A124-A126.
90. Judgment of 1 June 2000 (III RN 64/2000), cited in Jerzy Jendroska, Poland,
in IMPLEMENTING Rio PRINCIPLES IN EUROPE: PARTICIPATION AND PRECAUTION (2001).
91. Aarhus Convention, supra note 69.
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At the provincial level in Canada, the British Columbia Envi-
ronmental Appeal Board applied the precautionary principle to
help define the scope of "adverse effect" in a case addressing the
spraying of pesticides. In Shuswap Thompson Organic
Producegrowers Association (STOPA) v. BC (Minister of Environ-
ment Lands and Parks),9 2 STOPA appealed permits to use pesti-
cides to control weed growth along railway lines. The primary
issue was whether the spraying caused an "unreasonable adverse
effect."93 In determining whether there was an "adverse effect,"
the Board made specific reference to Principle 15 of the Rio Decla-
ration (on the precautionary principle) to support its conclusion
that proof of "scientific certainty" was not necessary. 94 The Board
ordered the permits to be amended. 95
2. Interpreting Domestic Legal Provisions
A number of cases discussed earlier in this article highlight
examples where courts have looked to international environmen-
tal law when interpreting domestic legal provisions. These in-
clude, for example, many of the cases upholding or voiding
governmental actions, which were within or outside (respectively)
the scope of legislation implementing international environmental
law.
G. As a Cause of Action
In a few instances, courts have used international environ-
mental law as a source of binding norms that establish a cause of
action. Courts in India, the Philippines, and other countries ap-
pear to have relied on principles of international environmental
law as a cause of action.96 In many of these cases, though, the
precise role of the principles is ambiguous: The decisions do not
make clear whether the causes of action are based on principles of
international law or if they are based on common law or constitu-
tional law as informed by international environmental law. The
92. Shuswap Thompson Organic Producers Ass'n (STOPA) v. BC, [1998] (Minister
of Environment Lands and Parks) B.C.E.A. 24.
93. Id. paras. 11(3)-(4).
94. Id. paras. 16-18, 29 (citing Rio Declaration, supra note 19).
95. Id. paras. 90.
96. E.g., Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, (July 30, 1993). (Phil.) (principle of
intergenerational equity); Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996)
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decisions frequently do not clarify whether the principles are a
source of norms or if they are simply persuasive.
It is more common for courts to rely on international law as a
cause of action in the human rights arena. In Canada and Austra-
lia, courts have held that instruments that were ratified but
unimplemented have legal force and create causes of action.97
Canada follows a dualist approach to international law, so in-
ternational instruments generally require implementing domestic
legislation to have legal force within the country. In Baker v. Ca-
nada, however, the Supreme Court of Canada held that values in
international human rights law may inform statutory interpreta-
tion and judicial review.98 In Baker, a Jamaican-born woman
with Canadian-born children had been ordered deported.99 She
applied for an exemption from the requirement that an applica-
tion for permanent residence be made from outside Canada, rely-
ing on section 114(2) of the Immigration Act (for humanitarian
and compassionate considerations). 100 In reaching its decision to
grant the woman an exemption, the Court considered three inter-
national instruments: the 1992 Convention on the Rights of the
Child (in particular articles 3, 9, and 12), the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and the 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights
of the Child.10 The Court noted that "the values reflected in in-
ternational human rights law may help inform the contextual ap-
proach to statutory interpretation and judicial review." 0 2
Ultimately, though, the Court relied on more than simply the val-
ues reflected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In fact,
97. E.g., Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313
(Alberta), available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1987/voll/html/
1987scrl_0313.html (last visited May 9, 2003); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 286-87 (Austl.), available at http://www.asutlii.
edu.au/cases/cthHCA/1995/20.html (last visited May 11, 2006) ("Where a statute or
subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction
which accords with Australia's obligations under a treaty or international convention
to which Australia is a party, at least in those cases in which the legislation is enacted
after, or in contemplation of, entry into, or ratification of, the relevant international
instrument. That is because Parliament, prima facie, intends to give effect to Austra-
lia's obligations under international law.") Id.
98. Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 861.
99. Id. at 825.
100. Id. at 826.
101. Id. at 861-62.
102. In a subsequent case, the Canadian Supreme Court cited this language when
it relied on the precautionary principle to uphold a municipality's authority to adopt a
bylaw restricting pesticide use. See 114957 Canada Ltde (Spraytech, Soci6td
d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, para. 30.
[Vol. 23446
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/5
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the Court looked to the Convention itself to justify granting her
exemption.10 3
Similarly, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v.
Teoh,104 the High Court of Australia held that a human rights
convention that Australia had ratified but not implemented estab-
lished a "legitimate expectation" that the government would fol-
low certain procedures.10 5 Failure to do so established a cause of
action, notwithstanding the fact that the government had not yet
developed the implementing legislation.1°6
The Supreme Court of India also has held that human rights
conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), can provide a substantive basis for a cause
of action under the Indian Constitution.10 7
The United States has looked to international law as a cause
of action through the Alien Tort Statute (ATCA or Alien Tort
Claims Act) of 1789, which provides that U.S. Federal Courts have
jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."10 The issue, then, becomes what constitutes "the law of
nations" or an actionable "treaty." Since 1980, plaintiffs have
brought a growing number of successful ATCA cases for torture,
illegal detention, disappearance, and other human rights viola-
tions. 109 Attempts to use the ATCA to hold parties liable for viola-
103. Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. at 864.
104. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273,
286-87 (Austl.), available at http://www.asutlii.edu.au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/20.html
(last visited May 11, 2006). The decision generated controversy. Immediately after it
was handed down, the government released a statement criticizing the decision and
stating that the fact that the government enters into a treaty should not create an
expectation that the government and its officials will comply with Australia's treaty
obligations. Legislation overturning the decision was drafted but was never passed.
105. Id. at 289-92.
106. Id. at 302 (explaining that Australia's ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child "in an expectation that those making administrative decisions in
actions concerning children will take into account as a primary consideration the best
interests of the children and that, if they intend not to do so, they will give the persons
affected an opportunity to argue against such a course.").
107. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
109. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (armed attack upon civil-
ians); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (torture and other abuses); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d
767 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (torture, rape, and
other abuses); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (torture and
other abuses); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (torture). See also
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tions of international environmental law have been less
successful. 110 Accordingly, advocates in cases that include a com-
bination of environmental and human rights grievances often em-
phasize the human rights violations.''
H. For Procedural Issues
International environmental law can provide guidance on pro-
cedural matters, including judicial review, standing, and reme-
dies. For example, the High Court of Australia rejected a
challenge to the nomination and acceptance of an area for inclu-
sion on the World Heritage List, finding that the existence of Aus-
tralia's international duty to protect and conserve a particular
property is conclusively determined by the inclusion of the prop-
erty on the World Heritage List consequent on Australia's nomi-
nation.1 1 2 While not explicitly saying so, the Court effectively
held that the decision to nominate and affirmatively accept an
area for inclusion on the World Heritage List was not subject to
judicial review. In Canada, the Supreme Court considered the In-
ternational Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
human rights instruments when it considered the issue of judicial
review of governmental action.113
Courts in a variety of countries have relied on international
environmental law to grant standing (in many countries, "locus
standi") to public interest litigants. These cases rely, alternately
on the Aarhus Convention, the World Heritage Convention, and
public international law generally.
In Ukraine, the Aarhus Convention served as the basis for
establishing locus standi of a public interest environmental law
NGO. In 2003, Ecopravo-Lviv (EPL) filed cases against the gov-
ernment of Ukraine challenging the government's decision to dig a
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that kidnapping was not the
type of egregious violation of core human rights that ATCA seeks to address).
110. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd on other grounds,
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
111. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001); Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2004); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696 (2d
Cir. 2004). But see Arias v. DynCorp, No. 1:01CV01908 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 11, 2001)
(alleged health and environment problems from herbicide spraying associated with
coca eradication).
112. Queensland v. Commonwealth (Daintree Rainforest case), [1989] 167 C.L.R.
232.
113. See Baker v. Canada, [19991 2 S.C.R. 817.
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deep-water navigation channel through Ukraine's portion of the
Danube Delta Bilateral Biosphere Reserve. 114 On February 10,
2004, the Commercial Court of Kyiv rendered a decision to sustain
the suit by EPL against the Ministry for Environmental Protec-
tion.11 5 The court based EPL's standing to sue on the Aarhus Con-
vention, which Ukraine had ratified, even though the country had
not yet adopted implementing legislation that would have guaran-
teed locus standi.1 6 The court went on to declare invalid the con-
clusion of a state environmental expertiza (essentially an
environmental impact assessment) regarding the Technical and
Economic Assessment of Investments for development of the ca-
nal.1 17 The court held that the public was not given an opportu-
nity to participate in the expertiza, and thus their rights were
violated. Accordingly, the court ruled that the consent by the Min-
istry for Environmental Protection regarding construction of the
canal was illegal and the decision was invalid.
Other countries have also applied the Aarhus Convention di-
rectly, often to grant standing to public interest litigants. For ex-
ample, in Estonia, two environmental NGOs brought suit against
the government for refusing to conduct an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) on the "Action Plan of the Estonian Oil-shale
Based Energetics for 2001-2006."1118 Under Estonian law, an EIA
is required for any large program that could have environmental
effects at the national or regional level.11 9 At the outset, the Tal-
linn Administrative Court held that, pursuant to the Aarhus Con-
vention, environmental NGOs do not need to prove that their
rights or interests were harmed in order to have standing in envi-
ronmental cases. 120 Using this broad interpretation of standing,
the court granted standing to the two NGOs.121
In Germany, a Federal Administrative Court in the Lingen
case 22 interpreted the German Nuclear Act in light of public in-
ternational law to grant standing to a citizen of the Netherlands
114. Letter from Andriy Andrusevych, Executive Director, Ecopravo-Lviv, to Carl




118. Estonian Society for Nature Conservation and Estonian Green Movement v.




122. Lingen, Federal Administrative Court, Decision of 17 Dec. 1986, BverwG E
75, 285, cited in Bodansky & Brunn~e, supra note 61.
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to challenge the authorization of a nuclear power plant in
Germany.
In Nepal, the Supreme Court of Nepal relied on the Constitu-
tion of the Kingdom of Nepal and the World Heritage Convention
to grant standing to public interest litigants to protect historical
and archaeological site. In Prakash Mani Sharma v. Girija
Prasad Koirala, a public interest environmental litigant asserted
that the construction of a building on the banks of Rani Pokhari
destroyed the beauty of a historical and archaeological site. 123
The petitioner sought an injunction to cease construction and to
demolish the structures that had already been constructed. 124
The Supreme Court held that the Nepalese government was
obliged to apply the commitments that it had made under the
World Heritage Convention. 125 The standing of the public interest
litigant to bring the suit was also an issue in the case. The Court
granted standing, holding that every individual was entitled to
show concern for public property and "public rights" under article
88(2) of the Constitution.126 Through the "public rights" term, the
Court thus held that the World Heritage Convention provided the
basis for public interest locus standi under Nepal's constitution. 127
International law can also provide assistance in fashioning
remedies. In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, a
NGO in India sought to institute a judicial inquiry into the deaths
of two persons killed by police in the State of Manipur, to prose-
cute the relevant police officials, and to obtain compensation for
the deceased person's families.' 28 Rejecting the state's assertion
that the deceased persons were terrorists who had been killed in a
shootout, a judicial inquiry found that they had been shot while in
police custody. 29
In fashioning a remedy, the Supreme Court of India used the
ICCPR130 to assist in applying article 32 of the Indian Constitu-
tion, which grants jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to enforce
fundamental rights, including the right to life (which is guaran-
123. Prakash Mani Sharma and others on behalf of Pro Public v. Honorable Prime











teed in article 21).131 In particular, the Court looked to article
9(5), which provides that "anyone who has been the victim of un-
lawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to com-
pensation."1 32 The Court noted that the ICCPR could elucidate
and help to effectuate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution; indeed, courts could rely upon provisions of the
ICCPR as facets of fundamental rights, and thus the ICCPR could
provide a substantive basis for the cause of action.133
The Court observed that when the government of India rati-
fied the ICCPR in 1979, it made a reservation to article 9(5) to the
effect that the Indian legal system did not recognize a right to
compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention. 3 4 How-
ever, the Court noted that in light of its earlier decisions, this res-
ervation was of little relevance. 135 The Court awarded the
families of each decedent a sum of Rsl00,000 (approximately
US$280 at the time of judgment) as compensation, as well as
Rsl0,000 to the NGO for costs. 136 Ultimately, the Court relied on
the ICCPR as a basis for judicial review, as a cause of action, and
in fashioning the remedy.
III. CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING APPLICATION
BY DOMESTIC COURTS
The various cases described in section II above highlight some
cross-cutting issues. Many of the judicial decisions cite interna-
tional environmental law, but the precise role that the particular
provision of international environmental law plays in the decision
is ambiguous. A second set of issues relates to limitations that
constrain the use of international environmental law by domestic
courts. This section concludes with some thoughts on prospects




133. Id. (citing Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183
C.L.R. 273 (Austl.) (dictum)).
134. Id.
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A. Ambiguity of International Environmental Law in
Judicial Decisions
As the cases cited above show, domestic courts increasingly
look to international environmental law. In some cases, the courts
are clear as to the legal effect of the particular provision of inter-
national environmental law. International environmental law
may be binding or persuasive.
In many cases, though, the precise role of international law is
ambiguous, vague, or inconclusive. In these instances, the deci-
sions consider, cite, and discuss international environmental law
in support of the ultimate holding, but the weight that the court
accords international environmental law is unclear. It could serve
as a cause of action, a rule of decision, an interpretive aid, or a
principle of national law notwithstanding the international status
of the principle, or as "commonsense. 137 However, in many cases,
137. In Leatch v. Director-General National Parks & Wildlife, a city council pro-
posed to build a road that included a bridge over a creek, which provided valuable
fauna and flora habitat. Leatch v. Dir. Gen. Nat'l Parks & Wildlife, (1993) 81
L.G.E.R.A. 270, 1993 WL 1405558 (New S. Wales Nov. 23, 1993). A Fauna Impact
Statement (pursuant to the National Parks and Wildlife Act) and a Review of Envi-
ronmental Factors were conducted. Shoalhaven City Council was required to apply to
the Director General of the National Parks and Wildlife Service for a license to take or
kill endangered fauna. Dissatisfied with the decision of which proposed road plan to
adopt, Ms. Leatch filed an appeal. Two species, the Yellow-bellied Gliders and the
Giant Burrowing Frog, were the principal subjects of the discussion surrounding im-
pacts on fauna. The appeal was upheld, with the concluding remarks citing the need
to weigh all pertinent factors when making a decision-in this case, the need for a
road, the specific location of the road, and the environmental factors involved.
After noting the recent addition of the Giant Burrowing Frog to the schedule of
endangered species, Justice Stein observed that,
caution should be the keystone to the Court's approach. Application of
the precautionary principle appears to me to be most apt in a situation of
scarcity of scientific knowledge of species population, habitat and im-
pacts. Indeed, one permissible approach is to conclude that the state of
knowledge is such that one should not grant a licence to "take or kill" the
species until much more is known.
Id. at 284.
His Honour further commented on the various activities that could modify the
frog's habitat or otherwise disturb the "essential behavioural patterns of a species."
Id. Under the circumstances, the Court then noted significant uncertainties regard-
ing the potential effects of the development on the frog. Accordingly, the Court held
that the license could not allow the taking or killing of the Giant Burrowing Frog
during the project's development. Id. at 286-87.
While the judgment discussed the precautionary principle extensively and re-
ferred to it as "commonsense," the specific legal status of the precautionary principle
is not specifically addressed. Id. at 282. The concluding remarks of the judgment do
not explicitly refer to the precautionary principle, and it is unclear whether the princi-
ple was considered one of international law, national common law, or commonsense.
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss2/5
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the court refers to international environmental law without ex-
plaining the legal status of the specific norm within the context of
the judicial decision.
A survey by Professors Bodansky and Brunn6e of experiences
of domestic courts in applying international environmental law
also noted this ambiguity. They observed that, "In a perhaps sur-
prisingly large number of cases, courts refer to norms of interna-
tional environmental law without explaining whether they regard
them as rules of decision, as an interpretive aid, or as principles
that, despite currency at the international level, are simply drawn
from national sources."' 38
With respect to principles of international environmental law,
Professors Bodansky and Brunn~e noted that many decisions
seemed to view the principles "as reflecting 'common sense,"' par-
ticularly in cases that interpreted and applied the precautionary
principle.139
A variety of reasons for the ambiguity might be posited.140 In
some instances, the status of the legal provision might be unclear.
For example, while many cases relate to the precautionary princi-
ple, there is controversy over whether the precautionary principle
constitutes a principle of customary international law, or if it is an
element of soft law, or if it is simply a good idea ("common-
sense").14' Accordingly, courts might seek to avoid taking a posi-
tion regarding the international legal status of a particular
provision. Similarly, there might be uncertainty within a country
about the role of international law in domestic judicial deci-
sions. 142 In other words, the domestic legal culture may be de
138. Bodansky & Brunn~e, supra note 61, at 20.
139. Id. at 15 & n.70 (citing cases from Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands).
140. The following possible reasons are based on informal discussions with judges
who have written some of the decisions cited in this article. They represent, however,
solely the educated opinions of the author.
141. Daniel Dobos, The Necessity of Precaution: The Future of Ecological Necessity
and the Precautionary Principle, 3 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 375 (2002); Owen McIntyre
& Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221 (1997); THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996).
142. The vigorous debate over the role of international law in U.S. case law pro-
vides one example. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law,
29 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2005); Joseph Keller, Sovereignty vs. International-
ism and Where United States Courts Should Find International Law, 24 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REV. 353 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human
Rights Treaties are the Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999);
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretative Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).
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facto suspicious of international law. In order to avoid being over-
ruled or treading unnecessarily into controversial areas, courts
might blur the specific nature of the international provision before
them.
In some instances, judges might not be particularly familiar
with international law or its relationship with domestic law.
Judges often are steeped in domestic law, its operation, and its
interpretation but have not been trained in international law or
practiced international law. Accordingly, they might be reluctant
to apply international law, even if they are in a monist state and
thus theoretically bound to give legal effect to the relevant provi-
sions of international law. A lack of fluency regarding the precise
role of international law in domestic litigation may also contribute
to judges giving more weight to international law than would be
merited under conventional legal theory (e.g., in a country with a
dualist system).
Even if a judge does accord appropriate weight to interna-
tional law, the judge might be intentionally vague about the ratio-
nale. This might be, for example, because other judges (e.g., those
to whom the decision might be appealed) may be less familiar with
or even hostile to international law, as discussed above.
Another complicating factor can be the dearth of relevant or
applicable domestic legislation. When a litigant or a judge is faced
with injustice without a clear legal basis under domestic law, they
may seek recourse in international law. In order to avoid injus-
tice, courts may then seek to justify the outcome on relevant inter-
national law, even if in theory such recourse is not rigorously
defensible. While critics might argue that such recourse is uncon-
stitutional, many of the decisions cited in this article were issued
by a country's highest court, which is the ultimate arbiter of what
is-and is not-constitutional. In these cases, where interna-
tional law fills gaps in domestic legislation, a court may appear to
rely on international law, but ultimately blur the precise role and
status of the relevant provision of international law in order to
avoid injustice without being unconstitutional. Thus, it should
not be surprising that a number of courts have looked to interna-
tional human rights law to fill gaps in domestic legislation. 143
143. E.g., Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 861; Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 286-87 (Austl.), available at http://www.
asutlii.edu.au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/20.html (last visited May 11, 2006); People's Union





Ambiguity can also facilitate incremental legal development.
The first decisions interpreting or applying international law
might be ambiguous for the reasons cited above, with subsequent
decisions taking increasingly clear interpretations that build upon
the earlier decisions.144
B. Limitations on Application of International
Environmental Law in Domestic Courts
The cases examined in this article illustrate a number of le-
gal, policy, and practical limitations that constrain the use of in-
ternational environmental law in domestic courts. The legal
limitations relate to whether international law has "direct effect"
and who has standing to enforce or invoke international law. The
policy/legal limitations include concerns about judges making law
and intruding into the political and foreign affairs realm of the
executive branch; both of these limitations relate to separation of
powers. Finally, as discussed above, there are practical difficul-
ties given that many domestic judges are neither very familiar
with nor comfortable applying international environmental law.
As may be seen from the growing body of domestic case law
applying international environmental law, courts increasingly
find ways to address and navigate these concerns. Accordingly,
while the constraints persist, they are usually limited in scope.
1. Direct Effect
Some courts hold that international environmental law, espe-
cially treaties, lacks direct effect. 145 In order for litigants to in-
voke international environmental law (either to support a claim or
a defense), it is necessary for the country to adopt implementing
legislation. Without implementing legislation, the argument goes,
international environmental law remains an obligation of the
country but does not become directly applicable to domestic
disputes.
There are various reasons for the doctrine of direct effect. It
may be a legal requirement articulated in the constitution (or
144. E.g., 114957 Canada Ltse (Spraytech, Socidt6 d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town),
[20011 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 S.C.C. 40 (extending reasoning in Baker v. Canada from the
human rights realm to the environmental context).
145. For example, the Appeals Court of the Hague held that the maxim of sic utero
tuo is not "binding on everyone," and thus could not be directly applied to a challenge
to transboundary pollution of the Rhine River. Judgment of Sept. 10, 1986, cited in
Nollkaemper, supra note 62, at 183, 187.
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other law), or courts may read it into the law. For example, in the
United States, in addition to the Constitution and national laws,
"all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby .... "146 As such, the
United States appears to be a monist state. In interpreting this
provision, however, U.S. courts have required a treaty to be "self-
executing" or "self-operative" in order for a court to apply the
treaty. 147 Moreover, in practice, the United States has tended to
adopt implementing legislation at the same time that it becomes
party to an international agreement. As such, while the U.S. Con-
stitution indicates a monist system, the judicial doctrine of direct
effect and practice suggests a modified system with certain char-
acteristics of a dualist system.
There are also practical aspects to the doctrine of direct effect.
While international law may prescribe general obligations and du-
ties, it often lacks precise standards, procedures, and institutional
frameworks. Without the specific implementing details, the regu-
lated community might not know what is expected of it beyond
general prescriptions.
Even if a court finds that international environmental law
does not have direct effect, courts often invoke it to assist in inter-
preting domestic law and they use it persuasively, rather than re-
lying on its inherent legal power. 14 8 As such, direct effect might
apply more in contexts where international law is argued to create
a cause of action.
2. Standing
Standing or "locus standi" relates to the legal capacity of a
particular individual or institution to bring suit before the
court.14 9 While the doctrine of direct effect governs whether the
court can apply a particular provision of international environ-
mental law (or whether the court is limited to considering it as an
146. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
147. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). In 1829, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a treaty might not "operate of itself' and thus not be directly
applicable. Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833). That has created the doctrine of self-executing treaties
and direct effect.
148. See Bodansky & Brunnde, supra note 61, at 20; see also supra section II.F.
149. See, e.g., John E. Bonine, Standing to Sue: The First Step in Access to Justice





interpretive aid), standing issues generally arise from an interpre-
tation that international environmental law creates rights and ob-
ligations for states, not individuals.
Standing has sometimes been an issue, but that is changing
rapidly. Legislatures and courts increasingly recognize the essen-
tial role that individuals and NGOs have in complementing gov-
ernmental efforts to enforce environmental laws. 150 Many
national constitutions guarantee standing of individuals and
NGOs to institute cases to protect environmental rights and pub-
lic health.151 Courts have also broadened standing through case
law.' 52 At the same time, international environmental law has
provided an impetus for expanding national laws to ensure public
access to justice, relaxing previously strict requirements for
standing.153
3. Concerns About Judicial Activism
Recognizing that the primary responsibility for implementing
international law lies with the legislative and executive branches,
judicial application of international law raises concerns about
judges "making law." This concern is based in part on the vague-
ness and "indeterminacy" 54 of international environmental law.
As a matter of policy, judges often prefer that the legislative or
executive branch define the contours of international law as ap-
plied in the country through implementing legislation or
regulations.
This concern manifests itself in a few ways. First, judges may
try to avoid issues of international environmental law, deciding
cases on purely domestic grounds instead. Second, judges may
150. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: LAW, LITIGATION & ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(Sven Deimann & Bernard Dyssli eds., 1995).
151. See, e.g., Carl Bruch et al., Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to
Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 188-98 (2001).
152. Id. at n.219 (citing R. v. Somerset County Council and ARC Southern Ltd. ex
parte Dixon, 75 P & CR 175, [1997] J.P.L. 1030 (Apr. 18, 1997); R. v. Inspectorate of
Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd. (No. 2), 4 A.L.L.E.R. (Q.B.) 329, 350h (1994) (up-
holding standing of Greenpeace, "who, with its particular experience in environmen-
tal matters, its access to experts in the relevant realms of science and technology (not
to mention the law), is able to mount a carefully selected, focused, relevant and well-
argued challenge.").
153. See, e.g., supra notes 68-71, 90-91, 115-18 and accompanying text (cases on
the Aarhus Convention); Carl E. Bruch & Roman Czebiniak, Globalizing Environ-
mental Governance: Making the Leap from Regional Initiatives on Transparency, Par-
ticipation, and Accountability in Environmental Matters, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,428
(2002).
154. Bodanksy & Brunnde, supra note 61, at 21.
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dismiss international law claims as not resting on self-executing
treaties. 155 Third-and this is often what happens-judges may
make reference to international environmental law without clari-
fying what role it plays in the decision. 156
The reservation to applying international environmental law
that is deemed to be too general stands in stark contrast to the
well-established judicial tradition of giving legal effect to common
law or constitutional provisions. 157 In most instances, interna-
tional environmental law has more detail than constitutional pro-
visions, although principles of customary international law often
have a level of detail comparable to that of constitutional and com-
mon law provisions. While operative constitutional provisions are
often limited to a sentence, if not a clause or a word,158 interna-
tional environmental agreements are often many pages long.
When the decisions of the COPs are taken into account, interna-
tional environmental treaties take on a character that is much
more legislative with regulatory clarifications (through COP deci-
sions), administrative guidance (from the Secretariat), and
(quasi-)judicial interpretation and enforcement (through the com-
pliance committee decisions and findings). To be certain, specific
details are often lacking, but that is not unique to international
environmental law as frequent disputes arise in domestic environ-
mental law regarding the scope of the law, the precise nature of
the obligations, and so forth.
Concerns about "judicial activism" frequently rest on claims of
strict legalism and the need to be faithful to the specific and plain
language of the legal text. Justice Paul Stein (a former judge of
the New South Wales Court of Appeal and the New South Wales
Land and Environment Court) has noted, though, that strict legal-
155. See, e.g., Lillich, supra note 87, at 855.
156. See, e.g., Leatch v. Dir. Gen. Nat'l Parks & Wildlife, [1993] NSWLEC 191
(Land and Environment Court of New S. Wales (1993) 81 L.G.E.R.A. 270, 1993 WL
1405558 (New S. Wales Nov. 23, 1993), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/nsw/NSWLEC/1993/191.html (last visited May 11, 2006).
157. While civil law countries generally do not recognize common law provisions,
many civil law jurisdictions have a robust body of case law interpreting and applying
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Bruch et al., supra note 151 (examining constitu-
tional environmental law cases from civil and common law jurisdictions around the
world).
158. Consider, for example, the significant body of case law in the United States
regarding the freedom of speech or guarantees of due process, both of which arise
from brief constitutional provisions. Similarly, the growing body of constitutional en-
vironmental jurisprudence illustrates the willingness of courts around the world to
interpret and apply general principles in an environmental context. See, e.g., Bruch




ism is neither possible nor desirable. 159 Strict legalism can mask
unidentified policy values. In contrast, judicial application of gen-
eral provisions-whether they are found in the constitution, com-
mon law, or international law-can provide a flexible means for
addressing injustices which are not otherwise addressed by legis-
lation. If such application is gradual and principled, injustices
can be redressed while also allowing the legislative branch an op-
portunity to address the issue through statutory development.
There are various ways to address concerns about judicial ac-
tivism. First, a country can clarify the legal status of interna-
tional environmental law within its legal system (e.g., through
constitutional provisions). If countries do this, their courts may be
more comfortable interpreting international environmental law.
If the provisions are general (e.g., principles of international envi-
ronmental law), such application might be in a manner similar to
interpretation and application of common law or constitutional
law. In fact, Australian legal scholars have observed that:
Customary international law has primarily affected Australian
law through its impact on the common law. Though Australian
courts traditionally adhered to the incorporation theory when
considering the impact of international law, in recent years they
have been more prepared to take into account of developments
in customary international law and the impact this may be hav-
ing upon the common law. This is particularly evident in the
area of human rights, where courts of all levels throughout Aus-
tralia have been prepared to interpret the common law to reflect
significant developments in international human rights law.160
Another measure to alleviate concerns regarding judicial activism
is to build judicial capacity regarding the appropriate role of inter-
national environmental law. Similarly, contextualizing applica-
tion of international environmental law in an analogous way to
application of general provisions of constitutional (and, where ap-
propriate, common) law can reduce concerns about judicial activ-
ism. Finally, careful and principled application of international
law can also minimize concerns.
159. Paul Stein, Environmental Law & The Judiciary After Johannesburg-Criti-
cal Roles in Compliance, Enforcement, and Dispute Resolution, Keynote Address,
North American Symposium on the Judiciary and Environmental Law (Dec. 6-8,
2004), available at http://law.pace.edu/environment/symposium/ceremony.html (last
visited May 6, 2006).
160. Rothwell & Boer, supra note 20, at 25 (emphasis added).
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4. Political and Foreign Affairs Concerns
One policy concern-with legal implications-is that applica-
tion of international environmental law by domestic courts could
intrude upon the political and foreign affairs powers of the execu-
tive branch, which includes respecting the sovereignty of other na-
tions. This is primarily a concern when a court might be called
upon to rule on actions in other countries and to apply standards
(even standards dictated by international law) to conduct in an-
other country, for instance under the ATCA.161 This is much less
of a concern, though, when a court is ruling on actions within the
nation in which it sits. Accordingly, most cases in which domestic
courts apply international environmental law relate to domestic
actions or inaction. 162
5. Unfamiliarity with International Law
As mentioned above, one practical constraint on the use of in-
ternational environmental law in domestic litigation is the extent
to which both litigants and judges are uncomfortable and unfamil-
iar with international environmental law. They are much more
comfortable considering, interpreting, enforcing, and applying do-
mestic law. In many countries, public international law-let
alone international environmental law-is not part of the re-
quired curriculum for law students. To the extent that countries
provide for continuing legal education, such training usually fo-
cuses on domestic law. Accordingly, litigants and judges have lit-
tle exposure to or experience with international law. Even if a
judge is familiar with international law, the judge might be un-
comfortable relying too heavily on it because other members of the
judiciary (including those to whom the case might be appealed)
might not be as familiar with or sympathetic to international law.
When considering these various factors together, commentators
have observed a "horror juris non domestici" on the part of many
judges. 163
The growing body of domestic case law invoking international
environmental law illustrates growing familiarity with interna-
161. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
162. Indeed, almost all of the cases cited in this article-except for the ACTA
cases-relate to actions within the territorial scope of the nation in which the court
sits. The Castlewood and Greenpeace cases represent a hybrid, resting in part on ac-
tions in a foreign country. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
163. See Galizzi & Giorgetti, supra note 79, at 179 (citing Tullio Scovazzi, Una
Storia di Panthera Pardus e di Horror Juris Non Domestici, RGA 250 (1998)).
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tional environmental law. Often, the cases cite earlier decisions
from their country as well as those from other jurisdictions that
have applied international law. Consequently, the cases build
upon earlier precedents, and in many instances decisions are
grounded in those earlier precedents. Thus, measures to facilitate
information exchange among judges and litigants16 4 not only raise
judicial awareness regarding international environmental law
and standards, but also provide precedents that can inform judi-
cial decisions.
C. Prospects for Further Development
Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of cases that interpret and apply international en-
vironmental law. As courts become more familiar with interna-
tional environmental law and with the body of case law applying
international law, it seems likely that this trend will continue.
In addition to growing familiarity, another key factor deter-
mining the extent to which courts will continue to apply interna-
tional environmental law and the nature of the application is the
development of implementing legislation. Many developing coun-
tries are parties to multiple international environmental agree-
ments but have only begun to develop the necessary legislation
converting their international commitments to domestic require-
ments. As countries develop implementing legislation, questions
may arise as to the legitimacy of the legislation (particularly in
federal countries), the precise meaning of the provisions in domes-
tic implementing legislation, and the legality of governmental ac-
tions pursuant to the implementing legislation. Accordingly, it
seems likely that international environmental law will continue to
play a role in upholding (or constraining) domestic legislation or
regulations; justifying or constraining governmental or adminis-
trative actions, especially those actions aimed at implementing in-
164. Such mechanisms include, for example, the UNEP/World Conservation Union
(IUCN) Judicial Portal (by which judges can exchange experiences, post cases, and
communicate with one another), UNEP's Compendia of Judicial Decisions, ECOLEX
(with legislation and case law from around the world), and the Environmental Law
Alliance Worldwide (E-LAW), which is a network by which public interest environ-
mental litigators exchange experiences and advice. See IUCN Environmental Law
Programme Portals, http://www.iucn.org/portal/elc/ (last visited May 9, 2006); Part-
nership for the Development of Environmental Laws and Institutions in Africa, http://
www.unep.org/padelia/ (last visited May 9, 2006); A Gateway to Environmental Law,
http://www.ecolex.org (last visited May 9, 2006); Environmental Law Alliance World-
wide, http://www.elaw.org (last visited May 9, 2006).
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ternational environmental law; and providing guidance in
interpreting provisions of domestic legislation, especially those
implementing international environmental law.
The development of implementing legislation may have a
countervailing effect on two other uses of international environ-
mental law highlighted in this article: its use in challenging ac-
tions by a private party, and its use as a normative cause of
action. To the extent that international environmental law has
been used as a safety net to address gaps in substantive law, the
elaboration of domestic implementing legislation may obviate or
reduce the need to seek recourse in international environmental
law.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
While courts have a role in giving legal force to international
environmental law, the primary responsibility for operationaliz-
ing international environmental law rests with the legislative and
executive branches. These branches adopt implementing legisla-
tion, regulations, and institutions to incorporate treaties into the
particular national context. The executive branch also has pri-
mary responsibility for administering and enforcing this body of
domestic implementing legislation.
As a practical matter, though, implementing legislation and
regulations often lag behind the development of international en-
vironmental law. To the extent that countries have adopted im-
plementing legislation, there may still be gaps, provisions might
be vague, or there may be legal challenges to the legislation on its
face or as applied. As such, international environmental law can
help to address the gaps, interpret provisions of domestic law, and
justify, clarify, or constrain domestic legislative or administrative
actions.
International environmental law can also facilitate enforce-
ment, including enforcement of domestic legislation implementing
international environmental law. Due to limited human, finan-
cial, and technical resources to enforce, or to a lack of political
will, enforcement can lag. As discussed above, 165 international
environmental law can empower private individuals and other
non-governmental actors to bring suits to enforce the law. This is
not to suggest that such actions should preempt legislative devel-
opment or official enforcement initiatives. Instead, private en-




forcement can complement governmental action, both in the
interim, (until the government develops the resources to effec-
tively implement and enforce international environmental law),
and on an ongoing basis (as with the numerous citizen-suit provi-
sions found in U.S. environmental laws, which allow individuals
and NGOs to act as "private Attorneys General," supplementing
governmental enforcement actions).
Notwithstanding the need for tools and approaches to imple-
ment international environmental law, promote environmental
and human health, and avoid injustice, these cases challenge con-
ventional legal theories regarding the role of international law.
To the extent that a country follows a monist system, courts
should-in theory-apply international environmental law with
equal vigor as domestic law. While many courts in monist coun-
tries do apply international environmental law, it is often more for
its persuasive value than for its normative qualities. At the same
time, to the extent that a country follows a dualist system, courts
should-in theory-ignore international environmental law.
However, as cases in this article highlight, courts in a number of
dualist systems have a well-established tradition of applying in-
ternational environmental law.
It may be tempting for legal scholars to dismiss the cases as
outcome-oriented aberrations resting on fuzzy legal reasoning.
This would be a mistake. There are too many cases in too many
countries to ignore or dismiss. The numerous instances of domes-
tic courts invoking and applying international environmental law
suggest that the legal framework is evolving, even if the theoreti-
cal basis has remained largely frozen in outdated dichotomies. In-
deed, then-U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
observed that "International law is no longer a specialty .... It is
vital if judges are to faithfully discharge their duties."166
Because practice does not conform to legal theory, it is time to
revisit the conventional legal theory regarding the role of interna-
tional environmental law in domestic courts. In particular, there
is a need to consider whether the growing body of case law repre-
sents a shift toward a more nuanced set of national legal systems.
If there is such a shift-and the case law appears to indicate that
a gradual but discernable shift is taking place-there is a need for
166. Associated Press, O'Connor Extols International Law, Fox NEws, Oct. 27,
2004, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,136839,00.html (last visited
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scholarship that articulates a revised analytic framework that
more accurately and clearly establishes the legal underpinnings
for applying international environmental law (and international
law more generally), as well as the parameters and procedures for
such application.
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